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Competing Models of Organizational Form: 

Risk Management Strategies and Underwriting 

Profitability in the Swedish Fire Insurance 

Market Between 1903 and 1939

 
MICHAEL ADAMS, LARS FREDRIK ANDERSSON, 
MAGNUS LINDMARK, AND ELENA VEPRAUSKAITE 
Mutual and stock insurers have coexisted and competed against each other in 
insurance markets for centuries. In this article, we examine the risk management 
strategies and underwriting profitability of the different organizational forms in 
Sweden’s property fire insurance market between 1903 and 1939. We demonstrate 
that stock insurers acted as intermediaries between policyholders and reinsurers 
to operate effectively in the potentially high-risk segments of the fire insurance 
market. In contrast, nationwide mutual insurers kept larger reserves to balance 
fluctuations in claims experiences, while local insurance pools relied on social 
obligation and trust to mobilize capital after adverse fire events. 
In their capacity as financial intermediaries and suppliers of risk management services, insurance companies have historically performed 
important functions in industrial economies such as risk diversification, 
risk transfer, and loss mitigation.1 Relative to other financial institutions, 
economic historians have not performed much research about the 
development of insurance markets nor about the organizational forms of 
insurance companies. Insurance transfers the risk of unanticipated acute 
losses on productive assets to third party insurers that have comparative 
advantages in risk pooling. Insurance therefore mitigates the probability 
of corporate and private ruin and ensures that funds are available for 
managers to finance investment opportunities. By supplying essential 
financial services, the economic contributions of insurance are evident 
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when viewed from a historical perspective, particularly its role in the 
development of the Industrial Revolution in the United Kingdom (UK) 
and the industrial breakthrough in Europe and North America.2 
Joint stock companies (owned by shareholders) and mutual forms of 
organization (owned by policyholders) have coexisted and competed 
against each other in insurance markets for a very long time. In Europe 
and North America, mutuals were the predominant form of insurance 
company in the eighteenth century. Stock forms of organization started to 
predominate from the mid-nineteenth century.3 Despite the predominance 
of stock insurance companies, mutual forms of organization are still very 
much an important feature of contemporary insurance.4 
Scholars such as David Mayers and Clifford W. Smith and 
Bruce D. Smith and Michael J. Stutzer argue that mutual ownership 
structures survive and prosper in insurance markets alongside their 
stock counterparts because they have inherent economic advantages 
arising from the merging of the economic interests of customers and 
owners.5 Specifically, mutual companies are able to effectively control 
for information asymmetries in insurance markets by restricting entry 
to the insurance pool to fairly homogeneous and predictable risk types. 
On the other hand, stock companies benefit from externalizing assumed 
risks across equity capital as well as policyholders’ funds and so 
they are better able than mutual companies to efficiently diversify and 
expand their business activities into broader lines of insurance. The 
different abilities of the two models of organizational form to manage 
capital costs and control information asymmetries has meant, however, 
that over time mutual and stock insurance companies have developed 
different strategies for managing risks.6 
The present study examines the issue of competing models of 
organizational form in Sweden’s property fire insurance market 
between 1903 and 1939 by analyzing how differences in ownership 
structure influenced underwriting profitability. 
We believe that the present study provides a good opportunity to 
examine competing models on the microstructure of insurance markets 
as there were different forms of organizational operating in the Swedish 
2 See Pearson, Insuring; Gottlieb “Asymmetric Information”; and Zanjani, “Regulation.” 
3 See Pearson, “Mutuality”; Zanjani, “Regulation; and Lindmark, Andersson, and Adams, 
“Swedish Insurance.” 
4 Mayers and Smith, “Contractual Provisions,” pp. 407௅34, and “Corporate Demand,” pp. 
351௅78; Smith and Stutzer, “Adverse Selection,” pp. 493௅510; and Ligon and Thistle, “Mutual 
Insurers,” pp. 529௅55. 
5 Mayers and Smith, “Contractual Provisions,” pp. 407௅34, and “Corporate Demand,” pp. 
351௅78; and Smith and Stutzer, “Adverse Selection,” pp. 493௅510. 
6 Ligon and Thistle, “Mutual Insurers,” pp. 529௅55; Smith and Stutzer, “Adverse Selection,” 
pp. 493௅510, and “Mutual Formation,” pp. 545௅77. 
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property fire insurance market during the period of our analysis. 
By examining the stock organizational form of domestic and foreign 
companies and the mutual organizational form of nationwide and local 
firms, this study also highlights potential differences within ownership 
structure that could impact underwriting profitability, and thus the 
long-run viability of different types of organization. A micro-market 
analysis of the competitive advantages of different forms of insurance 
organization can also show the effectiveness of ownership structure in 
managing information asymmetry problems and controlling agency 
incentive conflicts arising from the separation of corporate ownership 
from control. We believe that a historical analysis of the competitive 
advantages of different organizational forms has the potential to 
uncover key mechanisms governing the development and function of 
insurance provision as well as the expansion of insurance markets.  
The investigated period (1903 to 1939) was institutionally stable as 
far as insurance regulation is concerned. This helps us to mitigate 
complications arising from different institutional conditions arising in 
cross-country panels. The post-World War II period further witnessed 
more fundamental institutional changes in the Swedish insurance market 
following the passing of the 1948 Insurance Act. After 1948 firms 
attempting to enter Sweden’s insurance market faced much greater 
difficulties than they had earlier. Existing firms were officially organized 
into insurance groups, reflecting the cartel-like industry structures that 
had emerged earlier in the twentieth century. As a consequence, 
entry of new companies was largely restricted. Changes in agriculture, 
with concentration in larger and more mechanized farms and a 
general depopulation of the countryside, also had adverse implications 
for the business model of small local fire insurers. Therefore, we believe 
that the years 1903 to 1939 represent a fairly stable period to conduct our 
analysis from both an institutional and market structure perspective. 
COMPETING MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM IN INSURANCE 
MARKETS 
Academic research on the historical relation between organizational 
form and underwriting profitability in insurance markets draws heavily 
from the information asymmetry and agency theory literature.7 For 
example, Smith and Stutzer postulate that as mutual insurance firms tend 
to admit fairly well-known and homogeneous risk types, they are able to 
7 See Smith and Stutzer, “Adverse Selection,” pp. 493௅510, and “Mutual Formation,” pp. 
545௅77; Gottlieb, “Asymmetric Information,” pp. 270௅92; and Adams et al., “Claims Experience,” 
pp. 1074௅91. 
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effectively control adverse selection problems at the point of sale.8 
Therefore, mutual insurers are expected to predominate in local niche 
sectors of the domestic insurance market such as property fire insurance.9 
Mutual forms of organization, particularly small ones, have “club-like” 
characteristics and as such, they have advantages in managing moral 
hazard by reducing the likelihood of fraudulent or excessive claims. 
This is because members of the mutual insurance pool were obligated 
to act responsibly once insurance has been taken out in order to avoid 
unnecessary depletion of accumulated reserves. Peer group pressure and 
the threat of social sanctions in the event of fraudulent and/or vexatious 
claims will further bind the collective interests of mutual members to 
control the moral hazard problem.10 However, as mutual insurance 
pools became larger, the advantages in controlling for moral hazard may 
have been less obvious, as shown by Timothy W. Guinnane and Jochen 
Streb in their study of German health insurance.11 These intrinsic features 
of mutual ownership structure thus help economize on monitoring 
and contractual enforcement costs and enable risks to be priced on an 
“actuarially fair” basis.12 In turn, this quality enables mutual insurers to 
realize sustainable underwriting profitability and compete successfully in 
insurance markets alongside stock insurance firms. If this is the case, it 
implies that mutual fire insurers are likely to have higher underwriting 
profitability than stock fire insurers. 
Due to the concentration of policyholders’ economic and social 
interests in the insurance pool, mutual forms of organization can further 
economize on the transaction costs associated with accumulating reserves 
by purchasing reinsurance. With social trust and obligations, the risk 
management strategy of local mutuals could rely less on reserve levels 
and the purchase of reinsurance and more on the goodwill of all 
policyholders to maintain premium levels and not exit the insurance pool 
after an acute fire loss. The mutuals therefore might have been better able 
to aid the local community in recovering after a period of widespread 
trauma.13 This was particularly the case in Sweden where local 
community ties and socioeconomic obligations plus a historical legacy of 
local property fire support systems provided a form of social capital that 
reinforced the principle of mutuality and effectively substituted for 
8 Smith and Stutzer, “Mutual Formation,” pp. 545௅77. 
9 Lindmark, Andersson, and Adams, “Swedish Insurance,” pp. 341௅70; Lindmark and 
Andersson, “All Fired Up,” pp. 99௅117; and Adams et al., “Claims Experience,” pp. 1074௅91. 
10 Smith and Stutzer, “Mutual Formation,” pp. 545௅77. 
11 Guinnane and Streb, “Health Insurance,” pp. 70௅104. 
12 Pearson, Insuring; Gottlieb, “Asymmetric Information,” pp. 270௅92; and Abdul Kader et 
al., “Determinants of Reinsurance,” pp. 268௅84. 
13 Gottlieb, “Asymmetric Information,” pp. 270௅92. 
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financial capital such as reserves and reinsurance.14 Additionally, the 
dependence of small mutual insurers on the trust and support of local 
communities meant that they tended not to expand beyond their 
geographically defined market. Accordingly, small mutual insurers 
tended to be characterized by decreasing returns to scale. 
Lacking the benefits of close socioeconomic and geographical 
proximity enjoyed by small local mutual insurers, larger national mutual 
fire insurers tended to replace elements of social capital with financial 
capital in the form of reserves and reinsurance. Accumulating financial 
capital helped Swedish national mutual fire insurers to reduce the risk of 
dilution of the insurance pool after a severe loss event. It also enabled 
national mutual insurers to reward the “loyalty” of their policyholders 
by enabling them to participate in underwriting profits through annual 
and terminal policy bonuses and/or by cross-subsidizing premium 
rates with investment income. These financial attributes of the national 
mutual insurance structure allowed these companies to increase their 
share of domestic market premiums, diversify assumed risks through 
national expansion, and thus compete successfully with large stock 
insurance companies.15 However, as with local mutual insurance firms, 
Swedish national mutual insurers needed a fairly risk-homogenous stock 
of insured property to avoid excessive risk exposure on the insurance 
pool.16 
Some scholars, however, argue that stock forms of insurance 
organization have inherent advantages over their mutual counterparts. For 
example, Mayers and Smith argue that stock insurers tend to operate in 
more complex and risk diverse lines of business and so grant their 
managers more discretion to make decisions with regard to the setting 
of underwriting prices, reserving, and reinsurance strategies.17 Indeed, 
Hale Abdul Kader et al. find that reinsurance was a major driver of 
change and expansion of stock companies in the Swedish property fire 
insurance market in the interwar years.18 In addition, the managers of 
stock insurers could be motivated to maximize shareholders’ economic 
interests and increase period underwriting profits as a result of attractive 
remuneration packages, incentive schemes, and the disciplinary effect of 
the market for corporate control.19 Therefore, contrary to the predicted 
14 Lindmark, Andersson, and Adams, “Swedish Insurance,” pp. 341௅70. 
15 Lindmark and Andersson, “All Fired Up,” pp. 99௅117. 
16 Adams et al., “Claims Experience,” pp. 1074௅91. 
17 Mayers and Smith, “Ownership Structure,” pp. 351௅78, and “Corporate Demand,” pp. 
351௅78. 
18 Abdul Kader et al., “Determinants of Reinsurance,” pp. 268௅84. 
19 Cummins and Danzon, “Insurance Markets,” pp. 3௅38. 
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economic advantages of mutual forms of organization, it could be argued 
that stock insurers are likely to have higher underwriting profitability than 
mutual insurers. 
Abdul Kader et al. report that in the Swedish property fire insurance 
sector in the interwar period, stock insurers ceded a relatively greater 
share of annual premiums to reinsurance companies and were less reliant 
on reserves and loans compared with mutual forms of organization.20 
By holding smaller reserves and loans and purchasing more reinsurance, 
stock insurance companies might have been less exposed to changes in 
interest rate fluctuations than their mutual counterparts. On the other hand, 
stock insurers were more exposed to fluctuations in equity markets, which 
increased their costs of capital and affected the ease with which they could 
raise external capital to fund their growth strategies. Due to the inherent 
difference in the capital structures and risk assessment strategies of mutual 
and stock forms of organization, the economic advantages of the two 
insurance models are also likely to be closely related to developments in 
the macroeconomy.21 We examine these considerations further below. 
Between 1903 and 1939 most foreign insurers operating in Sweden 
were joint stock companies. While foreign insurers may have had 
economic advantages, such as the ability to draw on a large pool of 
insurance expertise and greater risk diversification capacity, they probably 
faced more severe information asymmetries in operating in the Swedish 
property fire insurance market when compared with their domestic 
counterparts. Mayers and Smith predict that joint stock companies are 
mainly found in lines of insurance business involving a high degree of 
managerial discretion over underwriting terms, premium rates, investment 
policy, and so on.22 Foreign stock insurers operating in Sweden’s property 
fire insurance markets in the first four decades of the twentieth century 
tended to rely heavily on the decision-making discretion of local manager-
agents which also meant that principal-agent problems could have been 
more pronounced in foreign fire insurers compared with Swedish fire 
insurance firms.23 This implies that the underwriting profitability of joint 
stock foreign insurers was likely to be lower than that of their Swedish 
counterparts. 
20 Abdul Kader et al., “Determinants of Reinsurance,” pp. 268௅84.

21 See Smith, “Investment Returns,” pp. 81௅98; and Hayley, “Underwriting Margins,” pp. 480௅93.

22 Mayers and Smith, “Contractual Provisions,” pp. 407௅34 and “Corporate Demand,” pp. 351௅78.

23 Lindmark and Andersson, “All Fired Up,” pp. 99௅117.
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RESEARCH DESIGN 
The analysis of the two competing models of organizational form 
focuses on their relative underwriting profitability in the Swedish 
property insurance markets between 1903 and 1939 and how that was 
linked to their risk and financial strategies, and state of the domestic 
macroeconomy. We therefore estimate an “underwriting profitability 
model” with a set of time-varying factors that describe the structure of 
each insurance firm. The firm-specific effects control for unobserved 
differences in risk profile and intercompany risk management expertise 
that are assumed to have varied randomly around the same mean for 
each insurer during the period of analysis. The time-specific effects 
capture changes in macroeconomic conditions that would have affected 
all firms in essentially the same way. To determine the most appropriate 
regression model to use, we follow William H. Greene and conducted 
two main diagnostic procedures—the Breusch-Pagan (BP) and Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) tests—suggest the using of robust standard errors. 24 
Second, the Hausman test between random-effects and fixed-effects 
specification was conducted and this favored the use of the random-
effects model.25 This can be expressed as 
(1) 
In the above model, Pit denotes the underwriting profit for insurance 
firm i at time t; Xit indicates the time-varying variables for each 
insurance firm; and Zit represents a vector of macroeconomic variables 
that only vary across time. Our model includes eight time-varying 
variables covering the key characteristics of the insurance firms in our 
data set. 
Underwriting profitability (UP) is represented by annual net premiums 
(P) minus net claims (C) and overhead expenses (E) normalized by net 
premiums [(P࣓C࣓E)/P]. A high profit means that claims and overhead 
expenses were kept down and a low profit means that claims and 
expenses were high in relation to premiums.  
Leverage is measured using the premium to surplus (P࣓S) ratio, which 
is defined as net annual premiums written divided by surplus (equity + 
reserves).26 The predicted sign of the leverage coefficient is uncertain. 
A large ratio of potential liabilities to assets can confer economic 
advantages by binding managers to ensure free cash flows are maintained 
24 See Greene, Econometric Analysis.

25 Hausman, “Specification Tests,” pp. 1251௅71.

26 See Powers, “Insurance Paradox,” pp. 113௅16.  
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in order to meet the requirements of fixed claimants.27 On the other hand, 
a high ratio might have kept the firms from pushing to write more 
business to avoid increasing insolvency risk.28 
Claims experience is represented by the ratio of claims incurred 
to the value of in-force fire insurance business underwritten, and 
is measured as the total value of annual incurred claims divided by 
the indemnity value of the stock of property insured. All else equal, 
we predict a negative relationship between the claims ratio and 
underwriting profitability.29 
Firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of annual total 
assets.30 This approach alleviates the possible effects of extreme values 
in the data set confounding the empirical results. Anne Grøn suggests 
that large insurers are likely to realize capital cost advantages over 
small insurers as a result of economies of scale and their ability to 
diversify risks across a bigger insurance pool.31 Therefore, other things 
being equal, large fire insurers are expected to have better underwriting 
profitability than local fire insurers. 
Reinsurance activity is measured as the annual amount of reinsurance 
premiums ceded divided by gross annual premiums written. Reinsurance 
enables insurance firms to reduce underwriting and insolvency risks, 
increase coverage capacity.32 Drawing from that result, one could expect 
a positive link between underwriting profitability and the level of 
reinsurance purchased by Swedish fire insurance firms. However, a 
positive relation may not be consistently found across all insurance 
markets. 
Liquidity is measured as the annual amount of cash and cash 
equivalents divided by current liabilities. Generally, fire insurers with a 
better liquidity position can save on the transactions costs of reinsurance, 
better protect their capital position, and realize higher underwriting 
profits than cash constrained fire insurance firms.33 Therefore, we predict 
that all else equal, high-liquidity fire insurers will tend to have better 
underwriting profitability and lower reinsurance than less liquid fire 
insurers. 
Investment earnings are measured as the annual percentage yield 
on invested assets net of transaction costs and management fees.34 
27 Jensen, “Agency Costs,” pp. 323௅60.

28 Cummins and Danzon, “Insurance Markets,” pp. 3௅38.

29 Adams and Hardwick, “Claims Estimation,” pp. 51௅63.

30 Abdul Kader et al., “Determinants of Reinsurance,” pp. 268௅84.

31 Grøn, “Capacity Constraints,” pp. 110௅27.

32 Abdul Kader et al., “Determinants of Reinsurance,” pp. 268௅84.

33 Ibid.

34 See Adams, “Investment Earnings,” pp. 41௅55.  
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Smith suggests that investment earnings can substitute for underwriting 
profitability and enable insurers to expand their underwriting capacity, 
enhance solvency, and concomitantly reduce the need for reinsurance.35 
As a consequence, other things being equal, Swedish fire insurers 
with high investment earnings are likely to have higher underwriting 
profitability due to lower leverage and fewer requirements to purchase 
reinsurance. 
The bank loans variable is measured as the amount of bank loans to 
annual premium income. This gives an indication of how Swedish fire 
insurers used mainly short-term bank loans (of less than one year) 
to increase their underwriting capacity and raise profit margins.36 This 
reasoning implies a positive relation between underwriting profitability 
and bank loans, all else equal. 
The ex-post premium payment dummy variable takes the value 1 for 
years when negative underwriting profitability is reported and otherwise 
0. It serves as a proxy for ex-post increases of premiums in the aftermath 
of abnormally large claims that led insurers to make additional calls on 
their policyholders in the event of increased risk of insolvency of the 
insurance pool. 
In addition to firm-specific variables, we employ a set of macroeconomic 
variables to control for cross-temporal variations in the results. The annual 
interest rate (INT) is represented by the average annual long-term (five­
year) government bond yield as fire insurers rarely held short-term bonds 
during the period of our analysis.37 Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
growth is taken as a measure of the annual growth of aggregated demand in 
the domestic economy. The annual rate of inflation is the average annual 
consumer price index. The stock price index is the Stockholm Stock 
Exchange General Index and it is used as a proxy for stock fire insurance 
companies’ stock prices and so only applies to this group of firms. 
Additionally, the exchange rate is used as a control variable for foreign fire 
insurance companies operating in Sweden during the period of our analysis. 
Exchange is measured as the Swedish currency in relation to the foreign 
currency (e.g., kronor per British pounds sterling). 
Given inherent operational and financial performance differences 
between the competing models of insurance organizational form, 
we estimated equation 1 separately for each of the four organizational 
forms included in the analysis. The four models are tested both with 
35 Smith, “Investment Returns,” pp. 81௅98. 
36 The use by Swedish insurance companies of (subordinated) bank debt to support insurance 
liabilities was severely curtailed by the more stringent insurance regulations (notably the Insurance 
Act 1948) that were introduced in the aftermath of World War II.
37 Larsson, Reglerade Marknaden. 
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firm-specific variables exclusively and firm-specific variables and 
macroeconomic variables together. In addition to the separate analysis 
of each organizational form, we have also tested for differences 
in the coefficients between the models. To test for differences in the 
coefficients for the time-varying variables within firms, we estimated the 
following model 
(2) 
In equation 2, Pit is underwriting profits, Xit represents the 
time-varying variables for each insurance firm, Org denotes a 
dummy variable for organizational form, and ȕ2 is the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction with the organizational dummy, and so 
represents the difference in estimated coefficients between mutual 
and stock ownership. The interactive effect is estimated pairwise 
across the different types of organizational form (i.e., foreign/domestic, 
stock/mutual, and national/local). A t-test is applied to each variable-
coefficient to test whether there is a significant difference between 
organizational forms. To fit the interactions in the model, we also 
normalized the variables to meet the requirement of integer variables 
and the maximum of interactions (N = 800) that could be accepted by 
the econometric software.  
Our data set comprises an unbalanced panel of 5,070 firm/year 
observations for the 37 years from 1903 to 1939 and includes Swedish 
property fire insurance companies in four categories: local mutual fire 
support funds, nationwide fire insurance mutuals, nationwide stock 
fire insurance companies, and foreign companies. The sample includes 
the large national stock and mutual property fire insurers that together 
accounted for approximately 80 percent of the market between 1903 
and 1939. The panel is unbalanced because firms entered and exited 
the Swedish property fire insurance market during the period of study. 
All financial and economic data for the Swedish property fire insurance 
market were obtained from the Swedish Official Statistics Series for 
Private Insurance.38 This source publishes key annual financial statistics 
for Swedish insurance firms by line of business on premiums written, 
losses incurred, reinsurance premiums ceded, and investment earnings. 
Macroeconomic data on interest rates, inflation, stock returns, and 
foreign exchange rates were obtained from Daniel Waldenström and 
38 Sveriges Officiella Statistik, Enskilda försäkringsanstalter, annually 1913௅1939; and 
Försäkringsinspektionen, Försäkringsväsendet i riket, annually 1903௅1912. 
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Rodney Edvinsson, Tor Jacobson, and Waldenström.39 In addition, 
relevant national accounting data used in the study (e.g., GDP figures) 
were obtained from Olle Krantz and Lennart Schön.40 
COMPETING MODELS OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS IN THE 

SWEDISH INSURANCE MARKET

The early history of the Swedish insurance market is first mentioned 
in medieval archives and county laws. At that time, insurance was based 
on compulsory public fire support institutions funded through a local 
cooperative system of “deposit and call.” Members of the “fire pools” 
had obligations to provide aid and assist in the physical and financial 
reconstruction of buildings that were damaged by fire. Therefore, 
from the earliest times in Sweden, social obligations and trust worked 
alongside mutuality principles within an institutional local community-
based structure of insurance. 
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the concept of 
Swedish mutual insurance funds was extended and co-evolved alongside 
local mutual savings banks. Reporting to the government inspectorate 
became compulsory in 1889 but even after the passage of the national 
Insurance Act (1903), local mutual insurance organizations were less 
rigorously monitored than the larger insurance companies. Around 400 
local, mainly rural-based mutual companies/funds existed during the 
period from 1903 to 1939, approximately half of which continue to 
survive in Sweden’s insurance market today.41 These mutual structures 
were typically situated in a single parish or in the countryside and 
they insured property owned by single households. Rural mutual 
companies did not tend to insure high-value/high-risk properties such as 
church estates, commercial offices, or industrial facilities. The market for 
industry fire risks that emerged in the wake of Sweden’s industrialization 
from about the mid-nineteenth century was met not so much by mutual 
insurers, but rather by larger and more diversified domestic and foreign 
stock insurers that emerged in Sweden at the time.42 
From the late nineteenth century to the immediate post-World War 
II period, the Swedish fire insurance market became clearly divided 
according to organizational form with mutual insurers writing mainly 
household property fire insurance and stock companies covering corporate 
property fire risks. An indication of this segmentation of Sweden’s 
39 Waldenström, Svenska Aktiekurser; and Edvinsson, Jacobson, and Waldenström, Monetary 
and Financial Statistics. 
40 Krantz and Schön, Historical National Accounts. 
41 Lindmark, Andersson, and Adams, “Swedish Insurance,” pp. 341௅70. 
42 Adams et al., “Claims Experience,” pp. 1074௅91. 
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domestic fire insurance market is revealed from analyzing fire insurance 
companies’ claims experience. For example, Table 1 indicates that over 
our period of analysis claims experiences were statistically significantly 
lower in local mutual insurers compared with stock insurance 
companies (t-stat 24.2) and foreign companies (t-stat 37.7). Nationwide 
mutual companies, insuring residential buildings in rural and urban 
areas, were exposed to roughly equal claims experiences as local mutual 
insurers. 
The results reported in Table 1 also suggest that over our period of 
analysis the average underwriting profitability of domestic fire insurers 
was on average roughly similar across organizational forms. A t-test 
across the domestic organizational forms shows that the differences 
in profitability are not statistically significant (t-stat < 1.2), although 
the profitability as a share of premiums ranges from 0.046 for foreign 
companies to 0.141 for national mutual companies. In turn, the standard 
deviations in underwriting profitability for local mutual companies of 
1.183 and of 0.499 for national mutual companies were substantially 
higher than the 0.277 measure for stock companies.  
Table 1 also shows that the local mutual fire insurers mainly 
kept their accumulated reserves as cash in banks. National mutual 
fire insurance firms held higher liquidity ratios of cash to liabilities of 
7 percent than the 4.6 percent ratios held by stock companies, while 
local mutual insurers held liquidity ratios of 73 percent. To offset 
their lower liquidity ratios, the national mutuals and stock companies 
purchased significant amounts of reinsurance, an activity in which the 
local mutuals did not engage.   
In the first four decades of the twentieth century, nationwide mutual 
insurance companies in Sweden were underwriting a fairly homogenous 
risk portfolio. The key segments were urban household properties 
(movables and real estate) and properties located in rural areas, such as 
churches as well as administrative buildings and agricultural facilities. 
Table 1 shows that the size distribution of insured risks for national 
mutual fire insurance firms operating in Sweden was fairly concentrated 
around the mean. The flat risk portfolio is mirrored in their observed 
claims experience where larger national mutual fire insurers had 
claims experience of 0.001 claims paid per premiums written that 
was three times lower than the 0.003 figure for domestic stock fire 
insurers (t-stat 20.3). Our dispersion measure also shows that national 
mutual fire insurers had more compressed risk portfolio than other 
forms of insurance organization as indicated by the standard deviation 
and minimum-maximum values of incurred claims. 
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TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS BY ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 
Panel 1: Local mutual companies 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Profitability 3,732 0.124 1.183 ௅8.978 0.999 
Leverage 3,732 0.327 1.340 ௅4.4 29.0 
Claims experiance 3,732 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.018 
Size (log scale) 3,732 15.73 1.40 3.22 14.30 
Age 3,732 51.47 20.98 0.00 151.00 
Liquidity 3,732 0.733 0.478 0.000 1.000 
Investment returns 3,732 0.044 0.055 0.000 1.159 
Bank loan 3,732 0.056 0.399 ௅0.003 10.690 
Ex-post premium  3,732 0.261 0.439 0.000 1.000 
Panel 2: National mutual companies 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Profitability 215 0.141 0.499 ௅3.090 0.841 
Leverage 215 0.096 0.243 0.000 2.986 
Claims experiance 215 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Size (log scale) 215 20.110 1.325 10.040 18.520 
Reinsurance 215 0.249 0.197 0.000 0.756 
Age 215 98.85 49.92 2.00 193.00 
Liquidity 215 0.070 0.070 0.005 0.511 
Investment returns 215 0.044 0.009 0.003 0.082 
Bank loan 215 2.011 6.393 0.000 46.330 
Panel 3: Stock companies 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Profitability 222 0.095 0.277 ௅0.945 0.455 
Leverage 222 0.286 0.169 0.030 0.700 
Claims experiance 222 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.007 
Size (log scale) 222 20.900 0.516 15.064 17.710 
Reinsurance 222 0.554 0.139 0.280 0.846 
Age 223 40.33 18.45 4.00 84.00 
Liquidity 222 0.046 0.077 0.006 0.433 
Investment returns 222 0.028 0.015 0.001 0.100 
Bank loan 222 1.458 2.071 0.015 10.957 
Panel 4: Foreign companies 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Profitability 901 0.046 0.643 ௅4.818 0.851 
Claims experiance 901 0.004 0.004 0 0.037 
Size (log scale) 901 17.24 0.96 13.56 19.37 
Reinsurance 901 0.587 0.182 0 0.999 
Age 902 31.59 19.23 0.00 76.00 
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TABLE 1 — continued 
Sources: Sveriges Officiella Statistik, Enskilda försäkringsanstalter, annually 1913௅1939; and 
Försäkringsinspektionen, Försäkringsväsendet i riket, annually 1903௅1912. 
The companies used different methods for dealing with large 
shocks. Local mutual insurance pools mitigated the effects of volatile 
claims over time by imposing additional ex-post “premium calls” on 
their members. To alleviate the financial impact of such “premiums 
calls” on members of the mutual pool, bank loans could be raised 
to smooth-out claims payments. However, the threat of individual 
policyholders exiting the mutual insurance pool when faced with 
an additional premium call also mitigated a great deal by social 
obligations, trust, and the threat of public sanction from the local 
community. 
In contrast, the larger national mutual and stock fire insurance 
companies were not in the same position to access and economize 
on proximate social capital. Ex-post premium calls would potentially 
have caused large-scale exits from the insurance pool. The likelihood 
of “insurance pool dilution” meant that the large fire insurers needed to 
compensate for their lack of social capital with financial capital, namely 
reserves and/or reinsurance. A small number of mutual fire insurers 
(such as the Städernas Allmänna Brandstodsbolag) had emerged in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century. In the early days of 
operation, social and community-interest concerns were important, 
while the commercial motives grew stronger in late nineteenth and 
early twentieth century. The last decades of the nineteenth century also 
saw the entry of nationwide mutual companies such as Svenska Brand 
(1890) and Tor (1888). Due to slow growth, the market for mutual 
insurance was mainly dominated by the older organizations throughout 
the period that we investigated. The nationwide mutual relied heavily 
on accumulated reserves to manage their underwriting positions. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, however, this risk management 
strategy was modified as reinsurance became increasingly important 
as it became more available as a form of contingent capital that could 
be employed by fire insurers to mitigate the effects of adverse claims 
experience and volatile underwriting.43 This enabled the larger fire 
insurers (both mutual and stock) to leverage new business opportunities 
(e.g., the industrial property fire insurance sector) and increase 
their market share. Compared with stock fire insurance companies, 
national mutual insurance firms mainly relied on accumulated reserves 
43 Abul Kader et al., “Determinants of Reinsurance,” pp. 268௅84. 
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to manage underwriting risks. The national mutual insurers had in 
effect generally lower leverage levels (t-stat 9.5) and a less of a share of 
reinsurance coverage (t-stat 18.7) than stock companies.  
The changing market structure for fire insurance in Sweden and 
the increasing role played by stock companies became evident from the 
late nineteenth century as a result of legislative and regulatory 
developments. For example, the Stock Corporation Act (1848), along 
with “nationalistic” public policy concern over an increasing foreign 
presence in the Swedish insurance market by companies such as 
Britain’s Phoenix and Alliance and Germany’s Magdeburg Fire 
Insurance Company helped to promote the establishment of a Stockholm-
based composite (fire and life) national stock insurance carrier— 
Skandia—in 1855.44 The primary purpose of this composite corporate 
structure was to channel savings from the life insurance lines to fire 
insurance since the life insurance funds were mainly invested in 
property mortgages, which in turn required insurance to protect the 
mortgage security from fire loss. However, over our period of analysis 
composite insurers such as Skandia and other national stock insurance 
carriers (e.g., the Malmö-based insurance company, Skåne) became 
overcapitalized relative to mutual forms of organization as mortality risks 
and the probability of severe losses from city fires diminished over time 
in accordance with improvements in life expectancy and advances in 
building design standards.45 
In the wake of the growing demand from industry for property 
fire insurance cover in the late nineteenth century, other non-composite 
stock companies such as Sverige (1879), Skåne (1884), Norrland 
(1890), and Victoria-Brand (1899) entered the Swedish property fire 
insurance market. In underwriting the fire risks of a rapidly expanding 
manufacturing sector, the underwriting portfolios of these large stock 
companies became more heterogeneous than those of the early mutual 
insurers. This increased level of risk diversity emerged not only as a result 
of the increased variety and complexity of the fire risks involved in 
industrial activities but also through the size distribution of industrial 
facilities which tended to be positively skewed. Typically, a few very 
large companies dominated in each main manufacturing sector of the 
Swedish economy at the time with a long tail of small enterprises.46 
44 Larsson, Reglerade marknaden; Lindmark, Andersson, and Adams, ”Swedish Insurance,” 
pp. 341௅70; and Lindmark and Andersson, ”All Fired Up,” pp. 99௅117. 
45 Lindmark and Andersson, “All Fired Up,” pp. 99௅117. 
46 Jörberg, Swedish Industry. 
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By the early 1900s the skewed distribution of property values across 
Sweden meant that fire risk exposures in the underwriting portfolios of 
stock insurers become increasing concentrated such that a fire event in a 
large facility, like a large timber processing plant, could have disastrous 
financial consequences for the insurer. This called for a risk-sharing 
strategy which was accomplished though reinsurance and coordination 
of tariffs organized through the Swedish Fire Tariff Organization (Svenska 
Brandtarifföreningen).47 This organization included both Swedish and 
foreign joint stock companies, and also a few large mutual organizations. 
The reason was that reinsurance could be purchased by members of 
the tariff cartel as common tariffs meant that information asymmetries 
between primary insurers and reinsurers could be more efficiently 
addressed. The mobilization of sectional business interests was also a key 
factor in formalizing praxis into legislation at the turn of the twentieth 
century. The Insurance Act (1903) further introduced more stringent 
licensing and solvency monitoring by the Swedish insurance industry 
regulator—the National Private Insurance Inspectorate—during the period 
of our analysis.48 
By meeting the demand from industry for indemnity against the risk 
of asset loss due to fire, stock insurers gained a strong position in 
the Swedish property fire insurance market. In 1903 stock companies 
underwrote roughly 70 percent of annual fire insurance premiums in 
the Swedish market, while national mutual insurers accounted for 
approximately 10 percent and local mutual insurers 12 percent of total 
annual premiums. The remainder was accounted for by foreign insurers. 
During the interwar period, however, stock insurers lost market share to 
about 61 percent of annual fire insurance premiums, while national and 
local mutual insurers increased their respective shares of the domestic 
market to 20 percent and 14 percent in the late 1930s.  
Most of the foreign property fire insurance companies operating in 
Sweden in the years of the twentieth century up to World War II 
were British stock insurers, which accounting for about 60 percent of 
all premiums paid to foreign insurers. A substantial number of these 
foreign insurance companies were also members in the Swedish Fire 
Tariff Organization, which gave them access to the fire reinsurance 
market and fixed industry rates of premium. These foreign fire insurance 
companies seem to have written property fire risks at the high-risk end of 
the market, as indicated by their substantially higher claims experience 
reported in Table 1. For example, foreign stock insurers had 133 percent 
47 Westall, Invisible, pp. 44௅66, describes a similar process of premium tariff-based cartelization 
in the U.K.’s fire insurance market that operated from the mid-nineteenth century to the 1960s.
48 Lindmark, Andersson, and Adams, “Swedish Insurance,” pp. 341௅70. 
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higher ratios of claims experiences to insurance written than did 
domestic stock insurers and the difference is statistically significant 
(t-stat 4.27). Table 1 also shows that on average, foreign companies 
tended to rely more on reinsurance than domestic companies (t-stat 85.7). 
Additionally, and consistent with our expectations, foreign fire insurers 
had significantly lower underwriting profitability than domestic fire 
insurers (t-stat 20.2). 
Our results also suggest that foreign fire insurers tended to rely 
more on reinsurance than Swedish joint stock companies. This 
observation suggests foreign companies were operating in narrow but 
more unpredictable market segments than their Swedish competitors. For 
example, foreign fire insurance companies tended to underwrite property 
fire risks in the steam-powered sawmill industry, an industrial sector 
in which British and German investors owned a significant share of the 
capacity. Steam mills, and associated timber products, were also prone 
to accidental fire events. Therefore, for foreign fire insurers aggravated 
information asymmetries and principal-agent problems could have arisen 
not only as a result of geographical distance but also because more 
unpredictable types of risk require more managerial discretion over 
underwriting terms and premium rates. 
UNDERWRITING PROFITABILITY AND RISK STRATEGIES 
Comparisons of coefficients in Table 2 and the t-tests for the pairwise 
comparisons in Table 3 show how the profitability of insurers was 
influenced by different characteristics of the firm and how the firms 
operated differently. The coefficients for different types of firms tend to 
be statistically different from each other for all of the characteristics 
except investment returns and bank loans.  
Locally based mutual fire insurance companies experienced volatile 
underwriting results over the period of study due to higher than expected 
claims. The coefficients in Table 2 show a negative and statistically 
significant relationship between claims and underwriting profits for all 
types of companies. The years when local mutual fire insurers relied on 
ex-post premiums were the years when underwriting profitability was 
severely depressed or even negative for a number of local companies. 
To survive after adverse fire events, ex-post premium calls were often 
necessary to avoid bankruptcy and maintain underwriting capacity due to 
the small reserves and the general lack of reinsurance cover held. As their 
policyholders had limited capacity to accommodate large fire claims and 
bear the burden of ex-post premiums, local mutual fire insurers became 
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TABLE 2 

MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF UNDERWRITING PROFITABILITY BY 

ORGANIZATIONAL FORM 

Stock  Nationwide Mutual Local Mutual Foreign 
Variables Companies Companies Companies Companies 
Firm specific Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 1 Mod 2 Mod 1 Mod 2 
Leverage 0.89** 0.74** 0.31** 0.36** 0.00 0.00 
Claims experience  ௅126.5** ௅135.5** ௅464.1** ௅515.6** ௅283.6** ௅283.4** ௅141.4** ௅140.2** 
Size (log scale) 
Reinsurance 
௅0.26** 
0.37*
௅0.19**
 0.02* 
0.03 
௅0.21 
0.08* 
௅0.76** 
௅0.04** 
௅0.08
௅0.03** 
0.23 
௅0.04* 
௅0.22** 
௅0.03 
௅0.20** 
Liquidity 
Liquidity squared 
Investment returns 
௅2.80** 
6.32**
4.01**
௅2.74**
 6.06** 
3.55** 
3.37**
௅5.10* 
௅4.05* 
3.59**
௅5.87*
௅9.60** 
0.10**
 0.00**
௅0.27 
0.05* 
0.00 
௅0.34 
Bank loan ௅0.26** ௅0.18** ௅0.11** ௅0.07** ௅0.09* ௅0.08* 
Ex-post premium 
Fire tariff 
Stock company
Foreign companies 
Constant 5.21** 6.85** ௅0.04 ௅1.46*
௅2.62** 
1.11**
௅2.61** 
0.85**
 0.01 
0.01 
1.24**
௅0.01 
௅0.01 
1.00** 
Macro variables 
Interest rate 3.92 16.66 4.09 ௅0.23 
Real GDP growth 
Consumer price 
Exchange rate: 
0.27**
௅0.44 
0.23** 
௅0.29 
0.48** 
௅0.14 
0.71* 
௅1.29** 
Denmark 0.000 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
0.001* 
0.001 
France 0.001 
Netherlands ௅0.001 
Norway 
Swiss 
0.001* 
௅0.001 
Germany 0.000 
R-square: 
Within 0.28 0.36 0.41 0.50 0.71 0.71 0.61 0.63 
Between 0.91 0.90 0.82 0.79 0.71 0.71 0.72 0.81 
Overall 0.66  0.69  0.51  0.57  0.71  0.71 0.58 0.61 
* denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.  
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TABLE 2 — continued 
Sources: Sveriges Officiella Statistik, Enskilda försäkringsanstalter, annually 1913௅1939; and 
Försäkringsinspektionen, Försäkringsväsendet i riket, annually 1903௅1912. 
increasingly dependent on short-term bank loans to maintain sufficient 
levels of liquidity and solvency. Those bank loans had a negative and 
statistically significant relationship with on underwriting profitability for 
local mutual insurers, underwriting profitability declined in the aftermath 
of adverse fire losses. An alternative risk management strategy would 
have been to accumulate reserves and thereby internalize fluctuations in 
claims experiences. 
The coefficients and t-tests in Tables 2 and 3 show that the 
leverage position of companies did not significantly relate to the 
underwriting profitability of local mutual, but were positively associated 
with profitability in stock companies and nationwide mutuals. Local 
mutuals with higher liquidity experienced profitability, in contrast with 
the negative relationships for stock companies and nationwide mutuals. 
However, reserve levels are positively correlated with the liquidity 
and underwriting positions of fire insurance firms. This indicates that the 
demand for bank loans in cash constrained fire insurance firms was 
greater than in entities with higher levels of liquidity. 
The coefficients in Table 2 show a small negative relation between 
size and underwriting profitability for local mutuals and a large and 
negative relationship for stock companies. The potential positive effects 
of economies of scale and efficient diversification of assumed risks 
across a larger insurance pool thus appear to be counteracted by 
associated difficulties in controlling the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems. A lower potential to enhance social capital in larger 
insurance pools might be another reason for worsening underwriting 
profitability. In addition to the firm’s specific characteristics, the 
profitability of local mutual fire insurers was to some extent related 
to general trends in the domestic economy. In fact, underwriting 
profitability was enhanced by higher national rates of real GDP growth 
for all firms. 
Turning to the nationwide mutual insurers, Table 2 shows a significant 
negative relationship between underwriting profitability and claims 
experience. The coefficient for nationwide mutuals was substantially 
larger than for other forms of insurance organization. To adapt to changes 
in claims experience, the main risk management method used by national 
mutual fire insurers was to rely on internal reserves and investment 
returns to finance claims. An additional way to manage periodical 
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TABLE 3 

T-STATISTICS FOR TESTS OF DIFFERENCES IN COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN 

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS FOR CORRELATES OF PROFITABILITY

 Domestic Companies 
Foreign to Domestic 
Companies
Stock to Mutual 
Companies 
Nationwide to 
Local Companies 
Variables T-stat  T-stat T-stat 
Leverage  
Claims experiance 
Size (log scale) 
Reinsurance 
௅11.72*** 
5.46*** 
18.72*** 
53.52*** 
௅1.92* 
௅6.55*** 
2.16** 
௅5.82*** 
௅5.31*** 
௅2.17** 
Liquidity 
Investment returns 
4.12*** 
0.38 
௅5.38*** 
௅1.21 
Bank loan 0.39 0.13 
Real GDP growth 
Consumer price 
0.30 
0.72 
2.08** ௅2.63** 
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level.

** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.  

*** denotes significance at the 1 percent level.

Sources: Sveriges Officiella Statistik, Enskilda försäkringsanstalter, annually 1913௅1939; and

Försäkringsinspektionen, Försäkringsväsendet i riket, annually 1903௅1912.

increases in the reported level of incurred claims was to use short-
term bank loans. The inverse relationship between bank loans and 
underwriting profitability indicates that loans tended to be taken out as a 
response to worse than expected claims experience, thereby relieving the 
pressure on internal reserves. Bank loans can also be seen as a means to 
manage liquidity constraints arising from weak underwriting profitability. 
Indeed, Swedish fire insurance firms with high-liquidity positions tended 
to have significantly stronger underwriting profitability than those that 
were cash constrained. 
With regard to the stock fire insurance companies, the results in Tables 
2 and 3 shows that the level of claims had a generally weaker negative 
effect on underwriting profitability than it did for other types of domestic 
insurers. The downward pressure on underwriting profitability resulting 
from higher than anticipated claims was mitigated by the large share of 
reinsurance which provided a contingent capital function in the event 
of severe fire losses. Table 2 indicates that the level of reinsurance had 
a statistically significant and positive relation with the underwriting 
profitability of stock insurers. In cases where the levels of reserves and 
reinsurance were limited, an additional measure used by stock as well as 
other Swedish fire insurers was to raise bank loans. In fact, we find a 
negative and significant relationship of bank loans with underwriting 
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profitability, indicating that bank loans were employed to finance claims 
and maintain liquidity after adverse fire events. 
In contrast to domestic stock companies, reinsurance had a negative 
effect on the underwriting profits of foreign insurance companies. 
This finding could indicate that foreign fire insurers were charged 
higher reinsurance premiums than their Swedish counterparts because 
they operated in riskier lines of business, like the forest industry, and/or 
faced relatively greater information asymmetry and agency problems 
due to the increased geographical distance of their business operations. 
This relation could also indicate a weak (underpricing) risk assessment 
by the underwriters of foreign fire insurance companies. Additionally, 
foreign companies reporting low or negative underwriting profitability 
could be suspected to be undercutting the tariffs. If the Swedish Fire 
Tariff Association suspected underpricing of premiums, such foreign 
companies were unable to purchase reinsurance companies under the 
terms of the cartel arrangement that existed at the time.  
As operators in an “alien” market, foreign fire insurance companies 
were exposed to additional macroeconomic effects such as exchange rate 
fluctuations. To address such issues, we tested for the effect of foreign 
exchange rate movements on underwriting profits. While exchange rate 
fluctuations helped to improve underwriting profitability for British and 
Norwegian insurers, other foreign insurers’ underwriting results were 
largely unaffected by exchange rate fluctuations. When controlling for 
other external effects on the business of foreign fire insurers, profitability 
improved in times of market growth, while rising rates of inflation 
reduced underwriting profits. Foreign fire insurers also tended to be 
affected more by changes in the level of prices in the economy compared 
with domestic Swedish fire insurance companies. For example, our 
results for foreign fire insurers in Table 2 indicate a higher coefficient 
estimate of 0.71 for real GDP growth in the foreign company equation 
than the estimates ranging from 0.23 to 04.8 for the three types of 
domestic companies. 
CONCLUSION 
Between 1903 and 1939 the ownership structure in the Swedish 
property fire insurance market was divided between stock and mutual 
companies. The stock insurers kept a dominant position but their 
market share declined from 70 percent in 1903 to 61 percent by 1939. 
Both competing models of insurance organizational form survived 
and flourished because they specialized in different segments of the 
fire insurance market. The similarity of underwriting profitability and 
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differences in strategy among domestic fire insurers indicate that the 
mutual and stock forms of organization had comparative advantages 
in different areas of business activity—for example, stock insurers 
generally operated best in national and mutual insurers functioned 
optimally in local markets. The different growth potential of these 
markets may be one reason for the growing market share of mutual 
insurers during the period of study. 
Exposure to a high probability and magnitude of fire losses, 
particularly in manufacturing industries and the positively skewed 
real estate value distribution in the industrial sector of the Swedish 
economy in the early 1900s generated significantly higher claims as a 
share of insurance underwritten for stock insurers compared with their 
mutual insurance counterparts. To effectively risk-manage policyholders’ 
fixed claims on the insurance pool over time, stock insurers took 
on an intermediary role by ceding a substantial share of fire risks 
written to third party reinsurance companies, (particularly on commercial 
and industrial properties). In situations where adverse fire events 
substantively depressed underwriting profitability, short-term bank loans 
were often used to maintain solvency levels and manage liquidity. 
Stock fire insurers tended to hold relatively small reserves for 
internalizing the financial impact of admitted claims and instead 
they purchased reinsurance to help maximize corporate profits and 
increase value for shareholders. Stock companies also tended to 
maintain higher underwriting margins after controlling for firm-specific 
and macroeconomic effects.  
In contrast, the risk management strategy of Swedish mutual fire 
insurers differed between local mutual fire insurers and larger mutual 
insurers that wrote business on a national scale. For local mutual fire 
insurers, the risk management strategy sought to externalize the impact 
of an adverse claims experience. Such mutual forms of organization 
relied heavily on the social obligations and the trust inherent in the 
local community as a means of “contractual enforcement” by demanding 
additional ex-post premium payments after acute fire loss events so as 
to avoid dilution of the insurance pool. In these circumstances, social 
capital essentially substituted for financial capital such as reinsurance 
and reserves. To help mitigate the financial burden placed on their 
policyholders, local mutual fire insurers would frequently use short-
term bank loans to supplement ex-post premium payments from their 
policyholders and maintain statutory prescribed levels of solvency.  
In the urban housing market, the principle of mutuality was modified 
to cope with the disparate policyholder membership of the insurance 
pool, and in many cases, private household fire risks were insured with 
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national mutual fire insurance firms. Their risk management strategy 
sought to internalize the effect of fluctuating claims on the insurance 
pool. Unlike their local mutual counterparts, national mutual fire 
insurers could not rely on trust and social obligation to maintain the 
insurance pool after severe loss to the same degree. Instead, larger mutual 
fire insurance organizations had to accumulate and maintain reserves. 
National mutual fire insurers used accumulated reserves to cross-subsidize 
the underwriting function and thereby reducing premium rates for their 
policyholder-owners. By keeping large reserves and ceding extreme tail 
end fire risks to third party reinsurance companies, large national mutual 
fire insurance companies could help keep their “policyholders on board” 
and still grow their business in the expanding housing market in Sweden, 
particularly during the interwar years. 
The results of our research therefore indicate that the evolving 
structure of insurance markets was related not only to institutional 
developments and changes in the macroeconomy, but also influenced by 
how different forms of organization used their particular comparative 
economic advantages to maintain underwriting profitability over time in 
different segments at the insurance market. This insight should help other 
scholars in examining the historical development of insurance markets as 
well as other organizational forms in other countries. 
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